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Why do people get married? Love, sex, children, money. Why do they get 
divorced? Probably for  the same reasons.  While most people would,  at 
most, want to hear what economists have to say about the financial aspects 
of marriage, economists (who, surprising as it may seem, marry and divorce 
like everyone else) have taken it on themselves to offer useful hypotheses 
about the rest of it too. 
For example, they have studied whether divorce laws affect the divorce 
rate. Before 1970,many states in the USA required both spouses to agree 
before a divorce could take place; now,  most states allow one spouse to 
initiate a divorce unilaterally. Under certain assumptions that economists 
have  spelled out, the type  of divorce law  would  not actually affect the 
number of divorces, even while it does affect the way that divorced couples 
share resources. Economists also have shown that the type of divorce law 
affects how married couples share resources, even if they do not divorce, 
and, theoretically, it might even influence how often they have sex. 
In order to understand these ideas, we have to develop a model of both 
marriage and divorce (or, in other words, a model that allows for changes 
over time in the utility from marriage). In this chapter, we will set the stage 
for this analysis by discussing trends in marriage and divorce in Section 1. 
The major changes in matrimonial patterns in North America and Europe 
that we will highlight serve as a backdrop for the analysis we will introduce 
in the rest of the chapter. Then, to keep things simple, we will discuss sep-
arately  the  gains  from marriage versus  living  together (Section  2),  the 
reasons  why  people  marry (Section  3),  the  nature  of decision-making 
within marriage (Section 4), and the nature of the decisions to marry and 
to divorce (Section 5).1 
1  Trends in marriage and divorce 
Figures 5.1 to 5.5 illustrate trends in marriage and divorce in several indus-
trialized countries.  Figure 5.1  shows  long-term trends  in  marriage and 
divorce rates in the USA, while Figures 5.2 to 5.5 compare recent trends 
in other industrialized countries. The figures show marriage and divorce 
rates by year - the number of marriages and divorces for each 1000 people 
in the population. It  would also be interesting to know the number relative 
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Figure 5.3  Marriage rates per 1000 population in Spain, Sweden and UK (1960-2003) 
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Figure 5.5  Divorce rates per 1000 population in Spain, Sweden and UK (1960-2003) 
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and divorce  (the  married).  We  are  not able  to  report those  statistics, 
however, because they are more difficult to come by and are not measured 
as accurately. 
It  is apparent from Figure 5.1 that we need to distinguish between short-
and long-run patterns in the data. Over the long run, the divorce rate in the 
USA has steadily increased while  marriage rates have  bounced up and 
down. The recent trends have been starker, though. The divorce rate more 
than doubled in the recent past, rising from 2.5 per 1000 people in 1965 to 
5.2 in 1980. It levelled off in the 1980s and then dropped back to 3.8 by 
2003, but it remains the case that almost half of marriages end in divorce 
(Cherlin, 1992). More recently, marriage rates have dropped off, falling by 
25 per cent from 10.5 in 1980 to 7.5 in 2003. 
Looking at Figure 5.1, it is not entirely clear that these recent develop-
ments  represent  major  breaks  from  past  behaviour.  For  example,  the 
divorce rate in the USA rose steadily in the early part of the century and 
then plateaued in the 1950s, making the later increase look especially sharp. 
In fact, if it had risen at the same annual rate as occurred between 1920 and 
1950, the divorce rate would have hit 5.0 in 1990, slightly above the actual 
rate of 4.7. Similarly, the marriage rate remains above the low of 8.4 that it 
hit in  1958,  which followed  a period of very high marriage rates.  What 
distinguishes the recent period is the same patterns - which, if anything, 
have been starker - occurring in other countries, along with a number of 
contemporaneous trends that are entirely new, including an increased fre-
quency of cohabitation, an increase in the  age  at first  marriage and a 
decline in the birth rate. 
Figures 5.2 to 5.5  compare trends in marriage and divorce rates since 
1960 in a selection of representative industrialized countries. Several fea-
tures of the data are worth discussing. 
First, the USA has had consistently higher marriage and divorce rates 
than other industrialized countries have. Interestingly, the number of mar-
riages relative to divorces started out widely divergent across countries and 
very low in the USA but has converged to around two marriages per divorce 
each year in most of these countries. 
Second, divorce rates in industrialized countries rose universally between 
1960 and 1990. The increase started a little earlier in the USA and also flat-
tened out sooner, around 1980. While the absolute increase was also largest 
in the USA, the percentage increases were higher in almost all other indus-
trialized countries. The divorce rate more than tripled in France and more 
than quintupled in Canada and the UK. Moreover, the USA is somewhat 
unusual in the 25 per cent decline that has taken place since the divorce rate 
peaked. In most other countries the rate of increase has either stopped or 
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Third, marriage rates in industrialized countries began to fall universally 
at some point between 1965 and 1985 and continue to drop today. These 
declines began after divorce rates started to rise and in many cases were pre-
ceded by a short-lived increase in marriage, perhaps reflecting remarriages 
among the newly divorced. The decline in marriage rates in the USA has 
been smaller in relative terms, at about 25 per cent from its peak, than the 
decline in other countries, which generally exceed 40 per cent. 
2  Marriage versus cohabiting 
What is the difference between shacking up and getting hitched? Marriage 
is  a contractual arrangement, with rules determined by church or state. 
For example, Jewish weddings are not complete until the bride and groom 
sign the ketubah, a marriage contract which, ' ...  spells out the husband's 
obligations to the wife  during marriage, conditions of inheritance upon 
his death, and obligations regarding the support of children of the mar-
riage.  It also  provides  for  the  wife's  support in  the  event  of divorce' 
(Anonymous,  2004a).  Brides  in  many  cultures  brought (or  still  bring) 
dowries  to  their  husbands,  with  religious  or  secular  law  determining 
the disposition of the dowry in the event of death or divorce. In other 
cultures, husbands must provide a bride price to the bride or her father. 
With some exceptions, non-marital relationships do not entail the same 
contractual obligations.2  Several  aspects  of marriage as  a  contract are 
important. 
First, marriage as a transaction may be costly in terms of time, effort 
and/or money to enter into and to leave. It  implies that the utility from mar-
riage must exceed the utility from being apart as well as the costs involved 
in getting married, and, possibly, divorced (although we do not emphasize 
this in the model of getting married, which we develop later). 
Second, divorce as the dissolution of a contract entails financial obliga-
tions between the spouses.  For example, one spouse may be required to 
pay income support to the other, and property acquired during the mar-
riage  (or even  before)  must  be  split  according  to  some  rule,  perhaps 
depending on behaviour during the marriage. There are a few motives for 
these  financial  obligations  associated  with  divorce.  One  is  to  provide 
support for children issuing from the marriage, although these rules affect 
childless couples as  well.  Another motive is  to punish certain types  of 
behaviour, which are viewed as violating the contractual obligations of 
marriage. An additional motive is to compensate spouses for some types 
of investments in the marriage, which are undertaken with the belief that 
the marriage will last. We will elaborate on the motives for these 'sharing 
rules'  as  we  outline  the  reasons  why  people  marry  and  subsequently 
divorce. 
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Third, the nature of the marriage contract has varied  greatly  across 
religions,  countries and time periods.  The Old Testament, for  example, 
established a right of husbands to unilaterally divorce their wives, for any 
reason or no reason, although not without absolving all financial obliga-
tions. Subsequent Talmudic law (developed in oral form before Christ and 
in writing after) gave Jewish wives the right to unilateral divorce when the 
husband, ' ...  is physically repulsive because of some medical condition or 
other characteristic, when he violates or neglects his marital obligations 
(food, clothing and sexual intercourse), or, according to some views, when 
there  is  sexual  incompatibility' (Anonymous,  2004b).  Jesus,  in  various 
gospels,  recognized  (though disapproved  of)  divorce,  while  the  Roman 
Catholic Church forbids it. Occasionally, legal and/or religious divorce law 
has changed in response to demands of influential society members (for 
example, Henry VIII). We will discuss some reasons why the legal regime 
governing marriage and divorce has varied as the circumstances surround-
ing marriage have shifted. 
3  What are the gains from marriage? 
At the outset, we listed several reasons - love, sex, children and money -
why people might get married. Let us consider in turn how each of them 
affects an individual's utility, and moreover why the impact may depend on 
whether the couple marries instead of just living together. 
3.1  Love and sex 
While love may be a many-splendoured thing, we will model it as a simple 
gain  in  utility  from  sharing  your  life  with  another.  Love  may  matter 
because you enjoy being with the one you love, and it may matter because 
it causes you to care about the well-being of the one you love.  In  other 
words,  love  may  be  an argument of your  utility  function  and it may 
change your utility function by placing weight on the utility of another 
person. Next, there is sex.  But is sex any different from love from a mod-
elling  point of view?  They  both require  another,  and they  both offer 
utility,  given  the right partner. Sex  may complement love,  if emotional 
intimacy enhances sexual satisfaction. However, there are other important 
characteristics of sex. One that we will ignore in this chapter is that there 
is a relatively well-functioning market for sex (via prostitution, discussed 
in  Chapter 7),  but not one  for  love,  since  sex  is  an act but love  is  an 
emotion, which is difficult to transact. Another characteristic of sex is that 
it involves certain risks. It may be for  the latter reason that sex  is  often 
associated with marriage. 
One risk of sex is disease.  Monogamy reduces the risk of disease, but 
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increase physical proximity and hence the ability to monitor the partner. 
Second, marriage, as a legal contract, often specifies penalties that raise the 
cost of adultery. For instance, it may provide grounds for the other partner 
to end the marriage or affect the distribution of income and property after 
divorce. 
Another risk of sex is pregnancy. The risk of pregnancy explains why sex 
within marriage may be preferred to sex outside of marriage - because the 
welfare of  children, and so the welfare of parents who care about their chil-
dren, is enhanced by making marriage difficult to end and by the financial 
obligations  imposed  by  marriage  (although  these  obligations  may  be 
imposed for children born out of wedlock as well). 
Seen in this light, one can understand why the advent of effective con-
traception in recent decades - by reducing the risk of pregnancy resulting 
from sex - has reduced the frequency of marriage and increased the fre-
quency of living together. While condoms have been around for millennia 
(Youssef, 1993), the introduction of the birth control pill has had a drastic 
effect, especially after legal decisions in the late 1960s allowed it to be dis-
tributed widely among unmarried women. That is, because it allows women 
to control their fertility, and women bear more of the costs of childbearing 
than men do.3 
3.2  Children 
Sex naturally brings us to talk about children. There are a few reasons why 
people have  kids besides the possibility that they are an accidental by-
product of sex. One is that they feel a biological imperative. Another is that 
they enjoy kids. Those two reasons look the same in a simple economic 
model- they are things that raise an individual's utility. 
What makes kids interesting for our purposes is that one kid may raise 
the utility of both  parents at the same time.  Thus, kids are public, not 
private, goods. In other words, one kid provides utility to two parents, and 
the utility one parent gets from spending time with the kid is not diminished 
by the utility the other gets from spending time with the kid - as long as the 
parents live together. If not, then kids are more like other private goods, for 
example spaghetti - if one person eats the spaghetti, the other cannot. Since 
kids cost about the same whether they live with one parent or both, it is 
efficient, from this perspective, for parents to live together. We will not have 
a  chance  to  say  anything  about the  decision  of whether  to  have  kids, 
although it may have some of the same features as other types of marital 
decisions, which we will discuss below. Other interesting decisions, which 
we will not discuss, are how many kids to have, and the trade-off between 
investing in child quantity (by having more kids) versus child quality (by 
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3.3  Public goods 
We already pointed out that kids are public goods. In a variety of other 
ways as well, it is likely that two can live as cheaply as one. Kitchens can be 
used to provide two meals about as easily as one, and larger sized bed linens 
are cheaper than two sets of smaller sized bed linens. One spouse's enjoy-
ment of heat in the winter and air conditioning in the summer is  little 
affected by the other's as long as their preferences over the ambient tem-
perature are not too different. The same applies to home decor (rugs and 
paintings) and to home entertainment (television sets,  cable service and 
stereos), once again provided that tastes are relatively similar - that is, that 
both spouses like to watch the same TV programme, or that one does not 
mind taping the football game to watch at a later time. Moreover, if being 
in love also means that your tastes are more similar, then that enhances the 
'public good' aspect of many household commodities. 
Suppose  that G stands for  quantity of public goods associated with 
living together. We  also will introduce X to stand for a private good, or 
bundle of private goods, which individuals consume. Consider a couple 
with similar incomes deciding whether to live together. If they live apart, 
then each faces  a budget constraint like AB  in Figure 5.6.  With similar 
x 
(private  B 
goods) 
A  c 
G (public goods) 
Figure 5.6  Budget constraints and indifference curves in marriage 148  Economics uncut 
indifference curves, the best each alone can do is reach point D where the 
'best' indifference curve is  tangent to the budget constraint. However, if 
they live together, then the cost per person of G is cut in half (because they 
can share it). Thus, the new budget constraint is CB, and they can pick a 
point like E (ignoring, for now, the possibility that they may have different 
preferences for G relative to X). 
Kids provide a strong argument for marriage as opposed to cohabitation. 
Since kids require costly investments that take a long time to reach fruition, 
the contractual nature of marriage (the fact that it may be difficult to leave 
and that leaving it imposes continued financial obligations explicitly related 
to kids) increases one's willingness to invest in kids. The same can be said of 
other public goods - it is worth investing in furniture together if we are rea-
sonably sure that the relationship will last - though with somewhat less force. 
3.4  Time 
There is another type of public good that is important to talk about sep-
arately.  It originates with the idea that a  person's time can be  used to 
produce something that is a public good. For example, a clean house is a 
public good because both you and your spouse enjoy it, and the utility you 
get from it does not diminish the utility your spouse gets from it. Similarly, 
if you spend time teaching the kids to say 'please' and 'thank you', then 
both you and your spouse enjoy the outcome of polite kids. 
What makes these examples different from the public goods discussed 
above is that time, rather than money, is used to produce them. However, 
money is being used indirectly, because using an hour of your time to clean 
the house has an opportunity cost - you could be working and earning a 
wage instead. That is why economists refer to activities of this sort as non-
market or 'household production' - it highlights the notion that you are 
using your time for something that is productive (it raises your utility) but 
is different from regular market production (by which you earn a wage to 
buy market goods that raise your utility). 
The idea of household production gets even more interesting when we 
consider the following question: how should the burden of household pro-
duction be divided between you and your spouse? One option is that you 
could split the work - you could do the household work in the morning and 
then go to work while your spouse takes over, or you could do it one day 
and then go to work the next day, or you could do it for one year and then 
go to work the next year. Another option is that you could do all the house-
hold work while your spouse works in the labour market full-time. A third 
option is that both you and your spouse could work and pay someone else 
to  do  your household work;  this is  possible for  almost anything except 
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The option that is least common is the first. There are two reasons why 
it is rare for both spouses to split household work and market work. One is 
that part-time jobs often pay much less per hour than full-time jobs. Thus, 
one spouse working in a full-time job will often earn considerably more 
than both spouses working in a half-time job. The other reason is  that 
market work often involves a career, rather than simply a job. By a career, 
we mean a job that requires a long-term relationship with an employer or 
fellow workers, or a long-term investment in skills, since many skills (for 
example, carpentry, surgery, computer programming) take time to acquire 
and deteriorate or grow obsolete when they go unused. Thus, 'career' jobs 
typically pay more than short-term jobs. 
All of this leads us to the notion of specialization - it often makes sense 
for one spouse to specialize in market work and the other to specialize in 
household work.  Again,  the reason is  that part-time work is  not highly 
remunerative  and interrupts  careers.  Individuals  on  their  own  cannot 
specialize, but individuals in a relationship can, if one spouse provides the 
income (which also goes further when it is used to purchase public goods 
for two people) while the other spouse provides the time for household pro-
duction. Moreover, marriage may be the preferred arrangement to foster 
specialization  precisely  because  of the concern that,  when  one  spouse 
specializes in household skills, they are giving up not just the current wage 
but a career and hence higher future wages. You would be more willing to 
do this if you receive some sort of commitment of compensation for the 
loss of your career in case the relationship ends. Alimony and property-
sharing arrangements associated with divorce provide that commitment. 
Consider a simplified model where utility depends upon consumption of 
potatoes as measured by X and the cleanliness of the house as measured by 
C, where C= Cm + Cf · Cm  and Cfrepresent the proportion of time spent 
cleaning the house by the male and female, and 1 - Cm and 1 - Cfrepresent 
the proportion of time spent working. Let W m be the daily wage of the male, 
w f be the daily wage of the female, and p be the price of potatoes. Further, 
assume  that  the  couple  maximizes  U(C,X m) + U(C,Xr),  subject  to  the 
budget constraint,  . 
2: w/1 - C) = p(Xm + Xf) 
i=m,f 
when  married,  while  each  member of the  couple maximizes  U( Ci'  X) 
subject to 
for i = m,J  when single. 150  Economics uncut 
Define (X!"  C!,) and (Xj, Cj) as the optimal choices of the male and the 
female  when  single.  Note  that  the  couple,  when  married,  can  choose 
(X!"Xj,C!"Cj) (the  same  bundle)  and  get  utility,  U(C!, + Cj,X m) + 
U(e:, + Cj,X f), which is more than the sum of utilities when single. This 
occurs because they each benefit from the other's cleaning time as well as 
their own. Alternatively, the spouse with the higher wage can reduce his or 
her cleaning time and spend more time in the labour market allowing the 
couple to buy more potatoes. For example, the male could reduce his clean-
ing time to C!,*= max(C!, - Cj,O), which is either the difference between 
how  much  time  he  would  spend  if single  (if  C!, > 9), or else  zero. 
Consequently, both spouses would receive at least as much household pro-
duction as when they were single, and the family would be able to buy more 
potatoes. 
A last question arises when we consider housework. Why is it that women 
have historically specialized in household production and men in market 
production? A key reason is because women bear the children, so they have 
to withdraw from  market work for  a  length of time.  Another possible 
reason is  that women are better at or care more about raising children, 
though this is  far from being proven.  In  terms of the model, we  could 
capture this idea by letting C=  aC f + Cm where a now captures the produc-
tivity of women in household production relative to men. The statement 
that women are better at household production is equivalent to the state-
ment that a> 1. 
A third possibility is that men are more productive in market work as 
reflected in relative wage rates. In fact, the model suggests that all that really 
matters is the ratio of wages relative to the ratio of marginal products in 
the household.  As  w f  /w  m decreases  relative  to a,  men will  increasingly 
specialize in market activity and women will specialize in household pro-
duction. While men's wages have historically greatly exceeded women's, the 
gap has narrowed in recent years. In 2002, women's average pay was 76 per 
cent of men's,  up from  59  per cent over a 40-year period (Anonymous, 
2004c). At this point, it is unclear whether women continue to be paid less 
for equal work (and hence choose to specialize in household production 
more often), or whether the wage gaps persist because women continue to 
specialize in household production for other reasons. 
4  How do married couples make decisions? 
The model we  developed above showed the potential gains from getting 
married.  Those  gains  are  not only  emotional  but result  from  a  more 
efficient use of time and resources enabled by two people living together. 
However, we have not yet said anything about how those resources are actu-
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be spent on marital public goods, but some will also be spent on private 
goods consumed  by  one spouse and not the  other.  Spouses must also 
choose  how  to  spend  time  on  market  production  (work),  household 
production (housework) and leisure. Consider, for example, three types of 
decisions: 
1.  Given a certain amount of money that is available to spend, how will 
couples decide whether to spend money on golf clubs or on Manolo 
Blahnik sandals? And what if another way to spend the money is on 
dinner at a nice restaurant? Or on a tricycle for the baby? 
2.  How will labour supply decisions by each spouse affect how much is 
spent on golf clubs, sandals or a tricycle? And how will spending pos-
sibilities affect each spouse's labour supply decisions? 
3.  How will the couple decide whether to spend money on golf clubs, 
sandals, a tricycle, a nice dinner - or else save for the future? 
These issues involve the allocation of money between private goods (golf 
clubs, sandals and so  on, designated X  in  our model above) and public 
goods (dinner together, a tricycle, saving for future expenses, and so on des-
ignated G). They also involve the allocation of time between working in the 
market (l - C in our model above, which earns a wage, w) and in house-
hold  production (and  producing marital  public  goods  C,  like  a  clean 
house), and taking leisure. 
The available evidence, as well as introspection, tells us that individuals 
are  not completely self-effacing  or altruistic in marriage,  and therefore 
spouses bargain over how to split shared resources. However, even as we 
make hard-hearted assumptions about the nature of bargaining, we can 
allow for the possibility that spouses get some utility from the well-being of 
their spouse. 
4.1  How do families make decisions? 
We  assume that individuals maximize the utility gained from such deci-
sions, subject to a budget constraint. Does a family act as a single decision-
maker,  maximizing  a  family  utility  function?  If so,  the  family  utility 
function depends on the total amount that the family spends on different 
goods regardless of who consumes them or on the utility of each family 
member. In these cases, we do not need to know how family members inter-
act when these decisions are made. Interestingly, a model that yields the 
same outcome is one in which one member of the family is a dictator who 
makes all the decisions to maximize his or her own utility. 
However,  empirical  analysis  has  rejected  a  key  implication  of these 
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within the family should not depend on who earns what within the family. 
In other words, unitary models imply that we would not have to know who 
brings home the bacon and who fries it up in a pan in order to predict 
whether high-fashion sandals,  high-tech golf clubs or a  tricycle is  pur-
chased.  However,  two  studies found that the share of income spent on 
men's versus women's and children's clothing varied in Canadian families 
(Browning et aI.,  1994)  and in  British families  (Lundberg et aI.,  1997), 
depending on the proportion of family income earned by husbands versus 
wives. Another study showed that, as the share of cash income accruing to 
women in Cote d'Ivoire rose, the share of spending on food rose and the 
share on alcohol and tobacco fell (Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995). 
4.2  Bargaining among family members 
If families do not make decisions as a single unit, then we are back to the 
model of individual decision-making with which students of microeco-
nomics are familiar. Nevertheless, being in a family still changes the way 
that  decisions  are  made  because  family  members  share  control  over 
resources and are affected by actions of other family members. A natural 
way to model these types of interactions is using game theory. 
Economists have focused on a particular type of game theory to explain 
family  decision-making  - games  with  cooperative  bargaining  between 
agents (or spouses, in this case). Define the value to the male of being in the 
relationship as Rm and the value of being separate as Sm' Similarly, assume 
that the value to the female of participating in the relationship is Rfand the 
value of not participating is Sf" R includes the benefits of relationships that 
we discussed earlier, and S includes the value of extra privacy and inde-
pendence and the cost of loneliness along with any monetary effects.  As 
long as spouses can agree on how to split the surplus,  Rm + Rf - Sm - Sf' 
from being together, then they will remain together. If they cannot cooper-
ate, then the best they can do is get utility Sm and Sf from being apart - so 
these are the threat points in the cooperative bargaining game because each 
individual will prefer to get S rather than to stay in the relationship and get 
R < S. Their bargaining determines how the surplus will be split, and thus 
the actual values of  Rm and Rj" Of course, they will both walk away if there 
is no surplus from marriage (Rm + Rf - Sm  - Sf<O), which is the same as 
saying that the  threat points exceed  the gains from  marriage for  both 
spouses (Rm < Sm and Rf < Sf)' Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and 
Horney (1981) defined the Nash cooperative bargaining model to marriage 
and defined the threat points as the utility from separating. 
John Nash demonstrated some important characteristics of the coopera-
tive  bargaining problem (Nash,  1950).  He showed that, under relatively 
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maximizes  the  product  of  each  spouse's  surplus,  (Rm - Sm)*(Rf - Sf)' 
subject to the household budget constraint. This solution is Pareto-efficient 
- neither spouse could be made better off without making the other worse 
off.  As an example, suppose that the utility of each spouse when separ-
ated is, Sm = Sf= 0, and the utility when they are together is Rm = U(Xm) and 
Rf  =  U(X), where  U(.)  is  a  standard utility  function  with  decreasing 
marginal utility in X.  Moreover, suppose that family income Y is going to 
get split so that, Y =  X  m +  XI" The solution that maximizes 
(R  -S )*(R -S)=R *R 
m  m  f  f  m  f 
=  U(Xm ) *  U(X f) 
=  U(Xm)*U(Y-Xm) 
is  Xm =  Xf =  YI2 - each spouse gets half of Y.  If we changed the problem 
so  that Sm = Sf= 1,  the solution would not change, as long as  Y12> 1;  if 
YI2 < 1, then the spouses would separate. On the other hand, if we changed 
the problem so that Sm = °  and Sf= 1, then the solution is Xm = YI2 - a and 
Xf =  YI2 +  a,  where the value taken by a is  positive (so f  gets more stuff 
than m) and depends on the actual form of the utility function U(.). It is 
important to note that the same results apply when U(.) depends not only 
on private consumption Xbut also on marital public goods and even on the 
other spouse's utility, so that spouses display some altruism (that is, they 
are willing to give up some of their own consumption in order to increase 
the utility of the other spouse). 
The key result, then, is that the allocation of resources to each spouse 
increases with their threat points. Knowing that, we can begin to answer the 
questions posed above. Along the way, we will also consider whether separ-
ation is the appropriate threat point in all situations of marital dispute over 
resources. 
4.3  Decisions involving spending: golf clubs versus sandals 
Suppose that all the money that the couple has is going to be spent imme-
diately, and entirely on private goods. The choice of who gets more of the 
private goods (golf clubs versus sandals) depends on each spouse's bar-
gaining power - that is, their threat points. If Sm > Sf' then spouse m gets 
more stuff. 
What determines the threat points? There are a few factors involved in 
determining each individua1's utility from being separate. One factor is how 
unhappy, emotionally, each partner would be when separated instead of 
together. If partner m would be much lonelier, while partner  fhas a lot of 
hobbies, then that reduces m's bargaining power relative to f's and hence 
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outcome would be observed iff  is much more likely to attract a new roman-
tic partner than m. 
A second factor affecting utility from being separate is  each partner's 
financial  resources  outside of marriage.  That in  turn depends  on their 
earning power  and on the  legal  regime  that governs  the  separation of 
marital assets following divorce. For example, if one partner (the wife, say) 
gives up a career to specialize in household production, that reduces her 
bargaining power over the distribution of resources within marriage. Why 
would she agree to this future loss in bargaining power? Perhaps she does 
it after extracting a large enough 'payment' up front in terms of family 
resources (perhaps a diamond?) that it makes up for the loss in bargaining 
power later on. 
Another possibility is that she can find a way to bind her husband to an 
initial  agreement  not  to  exercise  his  bargaining  power  later  on.  For 
example, the legal regime in many states in the USA is now set up to favour 
the partner who specializes in household production. On the other hand, 
many states used to distribute property after divorce according to who had 
legal title to it, which at the time was generally the husband, and some states 
even forbade women from owning property - which gave the husband most 
of the bargaining power within marriage. 
A third factor affecting utility from being separate involves child custody. 
Custody laws  that favour  mothers will  increase their bargaining power 
within marriage.  However, it is  becoming more common to assign joint 
custody following divorce. 
4.4  Decisions involving spending: private goods versus dinner together 
When we incorporate the possibility of marital public goods, we have to 
reconsider whether spouses make decisions in the same way.  There are a 
couple of possibilities. If they bargain cooperatively, then they will choose 
the Pareto-efficient level of marital public goods. The efficient level is dic-
tated by adding together each partner's marginal valuation of the public 
good, relative to private goods (whereas the efficient level of private goods 
is dictated by equating the marginal valuations). 
However, public goods are subject to free-rider problems when agents act 
non-cooperatively. The idea is that, if I know that you will provide some of 
the public good (by taking care of the kids, for example), then I will not 
bother supplying as much myself.  Moreover, if you follow the same rea-
soning, then too little of the public good (  child care) is supplied overall. 
Free-riding has been observed in many situations involving the private pro-
vision of public goods in non-marital settings. 
Which model is correct? In the case of child care, it appears that married 
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tend to act non-cooperatively (the second model) because it is difficult to 
monitor the other partner's contributions (Weiss and Willis,  1985). It  may 
even  be  the  case  that the non-cooperative bargaining outcome (under-
provision of the public good) is the operative threat point in a cooperative 
bargaining setting - it  may  be  more  realistic  than considering divorce 
during every conflict (Bergstrom et aI., 1986; Woolley, 1988; Lundberg and 
Pollak, 1993). 
There is also evidence that mothers care more about child welfare - and 
hence may contribute more to the public good, either in a cooperative or 
free-riding setting - than fathers. For example, unearned income given to 
Brazilian mothers is  associated not only with increased fertility but also 
with greater improvements in child health compared with unearned income 
given to fathers (Thomas, 1990).4 
4.5  Buying stuff today versus saving 
Another option is  not to spend - to save  resources for  the future.  For 
example,  an individual will  save  in  case of a financial emergency  or to 
finance retirement. It  will be worth doing this if the value of consumption 
in the future is worth more than the value today. 
However, a couple may make a different decision. This may happen in a 
situation where some of the future uses are public (benefitting both) and 
some are private (benefitting only one), yet both spouses may have control 
over financial assets (as is common today). Therefore, there is a risk that 
they decide to save for the future, but then one chooses to buy private goods 
later on. If both fear that the other will do this, then the free-riding result 
from above will hold here as well-the couple will undertake too little saving 
because  they are  not confident that the  other will  refrain from  buying 
private goods for themselves later. A related concern is that financial assets 
will  be divided in the event of divorce, in which case they cease to be a 
public good; thus, the increase in divorce rates in the USA may be a cause 
of the decline in private savings rates. 
5  Transitions into and out of marriage 
We  have  discussed the gains from marriage (and cohabitation) and the 
nature of decision-making by couples. At this point, we will talk about how 
couples decide whether to enter into or leave a relationship. 
5.1  Getting together 
Suppose a couple is considering forming a relationship of some type. Later, 
we will discuss different types of relationships (cohabitation, marriage) and 
how couples might choose among them. For now,  we can abstract away 
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Again, define the value to the male and female of being in the relation-
ship as Rm and Rrand the value to them of being separate as Sm  and,Sf" 
Further, for now,  assume that both the male and the female know the 
values of Rm,  Sm'  Rf' and Sj These issues are discussed in more detail 
below. 
Then, Becker's (1981) model of relationship formation says that a rela-
tionship will occur if and only if 
(5.1) 
In other words, the relationship will occur if the total value to the couple 
of forming a relationship is greater than the total value to the couple of 
being single.  Define the left-hand side of equation (5.1)  as  the total net 
value of the relationship. 
The condition defined in (5.1) is  uncontroversial when both the male 
and female prefer being together (Rm > Sm and Rf > Sf). Imagine, however, 
that 
R  -S >O>R -S· 
m  m  1  f' 
that is, the male wants to have the relationship and the female does not. If 
the total net value of the relationship is positive, then there is  some side 
payment or transfer p that the male can pay to the female such that 
Rm -Sm -p>O, 
Rf-Sf+P>O; 
that is, both would want to form a relationship. The side payment need only 
satisfy the conditions that 
If the couple sets p = Rm - Sm' then the male is willing to be in the relation-
ship because Rm - Sm - p = 0,  and the female is willing to be in the rela-
tionship because 
(because the total net value, as defined in (5.1), is positive). Similarly, if the 
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because Rf - Sf+  p = 0,  and the male is  willing to be  in the relationship 
because 
R  -S -p=(R -S )-(S - R»O  m  rn  m  m  f  f 
(again, because the total net value is positive). On the other hand, if the 
total net value is negative, then there is no side payment that will induce 
both partners to want to form a relationship; the payment required by one 
of the partners with a negative value is greater than the net benefit of the 
relationship of the other. 
In summary, any value of  p between Sf  - Rfand Rm - Sm satisfies the con-
ditions for a relationship to occur. What determines the actual value of p? 
It  may be the outcome of the Nash bargaining game we described earlier, 
so that the side payment p increases with Sfand decreases with Sm' In other 
words,  as  the  wife's  value  of being separated increases  relative  to the 
husband's, then the payment made from the husband to the wife (if p > 0) 
grows, or the payment made from the wife to the husband (if p < 0) shrinks 
closer to zero. Even if some other form of bargaining determines p, as long 
as it is efficient, it will not affect whether a relationship begins. 
Throughout this section, we have assumed that the couple can transfer 
utility from one member to the other withp. However, 'transferable utility' 
is a tricky concept. Bergstrom (1997) shows that, when there is no public 
good in the family, assuming transferable utility is not restrictive. Further, 
he derives a necessary and sufficient condition on utility functions for trans-
ferable utility to exist when there is a public good. We note the existence of 
the issue and proceed. 
How does one partner make a side payment to the other? It  may be in the 
form of allocation of household chores or relationship assets, as we dis-
cussed earlier,  or it may be  something less  tangible like  the payer being 
'extra nice' to the recipient of the side payment. One might argue that, in 
the real world, we do not see such side payments. However, sometimes the 
side payments may be difficult to observe (for example, being 'extra nice'). 
Also,  we  pointed  out earlier  that  many  empirical  studies  have  found 
evidence of unequal allocations of resources within families,  depending 
upon Rm - Sm relative to Sf-Rr A good example of such a side payment 
is that Stern was so anxious to work with Friedberg on this chapter that he 
agreed to let her have all royalties associated with the chapter. 
5.2  Breaking up 
Now consider a couple in a relationship - which implies that, at the time 
they chose to form the relationship, the total net value of the relationship 
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changes later on? If the total net value of the relationship is still positive, 
then the couple may renegotiate the side payment p so that both continue 
to prefer remaining in the relationship (even if one would not without the 
side payment). If the total net value of the relationship is now negative, 
then there is no side payment that will make both members of the couple 
better off in the relationship than apart, and the relationship ends. 
The key aspects of this decision are the following. First, the couple will 
not break up as long as nothing about the relationship changes, because the 
total net value remains positive. Thus, we have to think about what may 
change in the relationship in order to explain why divorces occur. Second, 
the model we have described so far assumes that all transitions into and out 
of relationships are efficient. A couple forms a relationship if and only if 
the total net value is positive, and they dissolve the relationship if and only 
if the total net value is negative. This is a key result about bargaining that 
was  first proposed by Coase (1960).  His work made it clear that several 
assumptions are necessary for these transitions to occur efficiently.  Later 
on, we will discuss the validity of these assumptions, some of which - most 
notably, perfect information and costless transitions - may not be reason-
able  when  applied to marriage and divorce.  Another implication of his 
work is that factors affecting the distribution of resources (and hence the 
utility of one partner relative to the other) will  not influence whether a 
divorce occurs, as long as divorce occurs efficiently. We will also discuss spe-
cific applications of this result later on. 
In the meantime, we will ask what factors may ultimately precipitate a 
divorce? Among economists, there have been three approaches to model-
ling the source of changes in the total net value of the relationship. One is 
to model a change in the characteristics of the relationship that determine 
Rand S over time. A second approach is to model how partners may learn 
more about the true values of Rand S over time. A third is to consider the 
possibility that actions taken by  partners during marriage directly affect 
subsequent values of Rand S. We will present evidence suggesting that, in 
fact, all of these probably occur. 
5.3  Changes 
What is  it about a relationship that may change over time? We  have  to 
consider factors that affect at least one of the values Rm,  Sm'  RI, and Sf" 
Some changes might arise because the characteristics or circumstances of 
one of the partners changes unforeseeably (due to, perhaps, job loss, or an 
inheritance, or the introduction of Viagra or Prozac) or some character-
istic of the relationship itself changes (because, say, the TV breaks down, 
so  the couple  no longer spends  time  together watching  their favourite 
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Consider an improvement in labour market opportunities for women. 
This probably raises Rm , Rf , and Sf" Both Rfand Sf rise because the female 
has new opportunities that previously were not available, so she is better off 
whether she is married or not. Rm would also rise as long as the husband 
gets some of the benefit from his wife's good fortune, perhaps because she 
purchases more marital public  goods.  Even  though Rm,  Rf'  and  Sf all 
increase,  however,  it is  likely  that Sf jumps the most (because now the 
female is less likely to have to rely on a male for those expensive sandals); 
it may be the case that Sf increases by more than the sum of Rm +  Rf (the 
value of marriage). If that is the case, there will be some couples in a rela-
tionship who will now separate because the total net value of the relation-
ship becomes negative. There will also be some couples who would have 
formed a relationship in the past who are no longer willing to do so, again 
because the total net value of the relationship is now negative. Thus, the 
model suggests that the observed improvements in market opportunities 
for women should reduce the marriage rate and, at least in the short run, 
increase the divorce rate, as has happened. 
Consider,  instead,  a  new  divorce  law  that requires  husbands to  pay 
alimony to wives (or, say, the partner with more income outside of marriage 
to pay the partner with less income). This will raise Sf while reducing Sm by 
the same amount, but, under one important assumption, which we  will 
discuss in a moment, it would not alter the total net value of the relation-
ship (Rm + Rf) - (Sm + S}- Consequently, if divorces occur efficiently, then 
it would not precipitate a divorce. Even though it makes separation more 
attractive to females, it makes it less attractive to males, so males will raise 
their side payments p to avoid divorce, which will satisfy females. Therefore, 
even though it would not cause a divorce, it would alter the distribution of 
resources within marriage. 
It  is important to point out the key assumption on which this conclusion 
rests,  since  it helps illustrate the main point.  We  must assume that the 
factors determining alimony payments do not i_nduce either ex-partner to 
alter their income - for example, by choosing to earn less in order to either 
win more or pay less alimony. If this assumption is violated, then the new 
divorce law  will alter the value of divorce (by reducing it) and hence the 
incentive for couples to divorce. 
All of these examples show that, if divorces occur efficiently, we have to 
draw a distinction between those changes that alter the total net value of 
the relationship R - S, and those that shift resources within the relation-
ship  without altering  the  total net value.  As  we  mentioned  earlier,  we 
will  discuss  the assumptions necessary for  divorces  to occur efficiently, 
and we  will analyse the consequences of alimony laws if divorces occur 
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5.4  Learning 
What happens if the couple learns about Rm and Rf over time? Consider a 
model  where  a  couple  meets  and  receives  imperfect  information  - a 
signal- about R = Rm + RJ  For example, they spend time with each other 
and start to learn how much they like each other. Based on the signal, the 
couple  updates  their  beliefs  about  the  value  of R  and  then  chooses 
whether to form a relationship. If they choose to form a relationship, then 
they enjoy each other's company and next period receive another signal 
about the relationship. Again they update their beliefs about the value of 
R  and make a  new,  possibly different decision.  Such a model can help 
explain why we observe both cohabitation and marriage. The advantages 
of marriage relative to cohabitation include some legal, religious or soci-
etal benefits, along with, perhaps, a greater level of commitment and inti-
macy; the disadvantage of marriage relative  to cohabitation is  the large 
cost associated with dissolving a  marriage.  Such a model  suggests  that 
couples  who  choose  to marry without cohabiting  received  very  good 
signals about the value of their match and are willing to risk a relatively 
small probability of future divorce to gain the advantages of marriage. 
Couples who choose to cohabit received a signal good enough to form a 
relationship  but not good enough  to commit  to  marriage.  Cohabiting 
couples are using cohabitation as an 'option' to commit in the future if, 
with  better information,  the couple  discovers  that it  has  a  very  good 
match. 
This model of learning may help explain certain facts about cohabita-
tion and marriage. Many empirical researchers have found that cohabita-
tion leads to higher divorce rates (Brien et aI.,  2006).  More precisely,  if 
we  compare  two  apparently  identical  married  couples,  one  of whom 
cohabitated prior to marriage, then the couple who initially cohabited is 
subsequently more likely to divorce. This fact has led some conservative 
social commentators to argue that cohabitation is destroying the institu-
tion of marriage, which perhaps it does by  somehow reducing the taste 
for marriage. The theory above suggests another story: those who marry 
right away  received very good initial signals and, on average,  have  very 
good matches;  while  those  who  cohabit received  initial  weaker  signals 
and,  on  average,  have  worse  matches.  Even  though  the  ones  with 
worse initial signals receive later signals good enough to induce them to 
marry, on average,  they are not as  good matches as those who received 
good enough signals to marry right away. An implication of this model is 
that, if everyone were forced  to cohabit prior to marriage, then divorce 
rates  would  decline  because  the  cohabitation  period  would  have  no 
direct effect on the quality of the subsequent marriage but it would serve 
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discover  that they  are not a  good match and would not marry in  the 
first place. 
5.5  Commitment 
Another potentially informative fact is that, the longer a couple is in a rela-
tionship, the less likely they are to end it. There are two popular hypothe-
ses to explain this phenomenon. One hypothesis is that it is essentially a 
statistical phenomenon related to selection. Consider the learning model 
outlined above, in which couples learn over time about the true value of the 
relationship R. Each period the couples who realize they have a negative 
total net value separate. Early on, all of the couples with negative match 
values separate. Over time, additional couples learn that they have a nega-
tive match value, but fewer do so over time because the remaining relation-
ships  have  a  higher average  value  of R. As  this  process continues,  the 
separation rate for couples married at a certain point in time falls because 
the couples with lower values of R are selected out through divorce, even 
though there is no direct effect of duration on relationship quality. 
The second hypothesis is that the relationship itself causes the value of 
the relationship to increase over time. In other words, the couple invests in 
their relationship as it develops. They invest by learning how to interact 
with each other, maybe by buying assets (such as a house) together, having 
children together, or in other ways intensifying their commitment to each 
other. Each time they invest in their relationship, they build a larger wedge 
between the total value of the relationship R and the total value of sep-
arating, S, thus decreasing the probability of separation. 
We can take the model one step further and note that these investments 
are sunk in the match itself, and if the relationship dissolves, then most, if 
not all, of the value of the investments is lost. For example, it may be very 
costly to children for a married couple to divorce, or there may be large 
transactions costs associated with dividing up the value of a house upon 
separation. An implication of this point is  that couples with very good 
matches will be more likely to invest in their relationship than those with 
less  good matches.  The couples with mediocre matches will  hesitate  to 
invest because they know there is a significant probability of dissolution in 
the future.  Moreover,  married couples will invest more than cohabiting 
couples because, a) they have better matches (see the discussion above) and, 
b) separation costs are higher for marriage than for cohabitation, so sep-
aration is less likely. The phenomenon that the level of investment depends 
upon the quality of the match is called endogenous investment. It has the 
feature that investment increases the variability of match quality, making 
the best relationships even  better and not having much of an effect on 
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5.6  Breaking up is hard (or easy) to do 
In the simple model above,  we showed that all separations are efficient -
they occur if and only if the total net value of the relationship (Rm + Rf) -
(Sm + S) =  R - S turns negative. Most non-economists are not comfortable 
with this result, so it is useful to examine the underlying assumptions on 
which the result depends. 
In this case, one offending assumption is that partners have perfect infor-
mation: this requires that the male knows as much about Rf and Sf as the 
female, and vice versa. Consider, instead, a model where each member of a 
relationship has some information about his or her own preferences not 
observable by the other member. The couple has to bargain about the size 
of any side payment p from one to the other. If each had perfect informa-
tion about the other's p:-eferences, they would know the range of side pay-
ments (Sf- Rf and Rm - Sm)  necessary to satisfy the condition that both 
would be better off in the relationship than not. However, if each has some 
unobservable information, then he or she has an incentive to lie about it to 
get a better deal. Knowing that, partners will still bargain, but now they will 
consider the trade-off between getting a bigger side payment (by exagger-
ating about the value of one's outside option, S) against the loss associated 
with a possible separation if the other partner refuses a large side payment. 
In such a situation, some couples break up even though the total net value 
of the relationship is positive (so breaking up is too easy). 
Another  controversial  assumption  is  that  transitions  are  costless. 
Suppose instead that the government (or perhaps a religious authority) 
imposes  a  significant  monetary or non-monetary cost  D  on divorcing 
couples. The immediate effect of such a cost is to decrease Sm and Sj For 
example, if the divorcing couple split the cost D equally, then the new values 
of being single are Sm -!D and Sf-!D. Since Sm and Sf decline and there 
is no change in Rm and Rf' the total net value of the relationship increases. 
Thus,  the  effect  of the  divorce  cost  is,  unsurprisingly,  to  decrease  the 
number of couples who divorce (so breaking up is too hard). 
It  is important to note, however, that the allocation of the divorce costs 
between the male and female has no effect on whether a divorce occurs, 
since the decision to divorce depends only on the total net value (including 
divorce costs). A law that required the cost to be shared equally would not 
affect the total net value differently than a law that requires the husband, 
say, to pay the entire cost. All that would change would be the relative size 
Qf  Sf and  Sm'  The  husband would  be  willing  to  provide  a  larger side 
payment to stay married and avoid  Sm - D, but the wife  would only be 
willing to accept it if the total net value was positive. This is analogous to 
the result, presented above,  that laws mandating alimony payments after 
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In the last few  examples,  we  considered how changes in divorce laws 
affect the frequency of divorces (imposing a divorce cost reduces the inci-
dence of divorce, but the allocation of the cost between partners does not). 
But how do they affect the marriage rate? Consider a couple deeply in love -
they  are  considering  marriage  and  not  worrying  about  the  future. 
Following in  the footsteps of other romantic couples before them, they 
compute the total net value of the relationship, and, if it is positive, nego-
tiate side payments and marry. Divorce costs and alimony rules play no 
role in their decision of whether to marry because they do not consider pos-
sible changes in the value of the relationship. If, in contrast, they recognize 
that things may change and divorces do occur, then imposing future divorce 
costs essentially increases the cost of marrying today, thus decreasing the 
total net value. Therefore, the marriage rate would decrease, but also those 
marriages that do occur would be stronger (in the sense that the total net 
value of the marriage would be higher). 
5. 7  Policy interventions 
As we have demonstrated, if divorces occur efficiently,  then divorce laws 
affecting  the distribution of resources will  not affect  whether a divorce 
occurs. Even divorce laws that do not directly determine the distribution of 
resources can be interpreted in the same way.  Before 1970, most states in 
the USA required divorcing couples to demonstrate some fault - adultery, 
abuse,  abandonment and so  on - in order to grant a divorce.  This was 
implicitly a mutual consent divorce regime; if a couple wanted to divorce, 
they could lie about fault and obtain a divorce. Led by California in 1970, 
most  states  changed  their  law  to  allow  both  no-fault  and  unilateral 
divorce - so  that one couple could instigate a  divorce  unilaterally and 
without alleging fault.  This raises two  questions:  should this affect  the 
divorce rate, and did it affect the divorce rate? 
If divorces occur efficiently, then changing the law from mutual to uni-
lateral divorce should not affect the divorce rate. Instead, it acts to redis-
tribute resources from the spouse who wants to stay in  the relationship 
(because  Rm>Sm)  to  the  spouse  who  wants  to leave  (because Rf<S/ 
Under a mutual consent divorce law, the spouse who wants to leave will be 
willing to make a side payment that the spouse who wants to stay is willing 
to accept to agree to a divorce, as long as S  rn - Rm > Rf - Sf' so the gain to 
spouse m from leaving the relationship exceeds the gain to spouse f from 
staying in the relationship. Rearranging terms, this implies that (Rrn +  Rf ) -
(Sm + S ) < 0, or the total net value of the relationship is negative. 
On the other hand, if the total net value is positive, then the payment that 
f is willing to make to obtain a divorce is smaller than the payment that m 
is willing to take in order to grant a divorce. Now, suppose that the divorce 164  Economics uncut 
law changes to allow unilateral divorce - would  f now go ahead and get that 
divorce? Because the total net value of the relationship is positive, m would 
now be willing to pay fto stay in the marriage, and the payment would be 
big enough to makefwilling to stay. Thus, even though the law now allows 
fto leave unilaterally,fwould not go unless the total net value of the rela-
tionship is negative - so the divorce rate would be unchanged, even though 
it looks like the law change has made divorce easier. What changes would 
be the direction of payments, from the spouse who wants to leave the mar-
riage to the spouse who wants to stay. 
However, empirical evidence suggests that the divorce rate rose in states 
in the USA after they changed their divorce laws (Friedberg, 1998). This 
suggests that divorces do not occur efficiently.  This belief is  widespread 
among policy-makers, who have recently reacted by discussing policies that 
would increase the cost of divorce. A number of states in the USA have pro-
posed giving people a choice of two marriage types: a regular marriage or 
a 'covenant marriage'. A covenant marriage has extra costs associated with 
divorce. The Catholic Church has suggested it will approve only covenant 
marriages in states that provide them. 
The analysis in our perfect information model suggests that such govern-
ment interference will not have the intended effect because all marital sep-
arations  are  efficient.  In this  subsection,  we  consider  various  possible 
reasons why it might be welfare improving for the government to discour-
age divorce. 
The most obvious possibility is the effects of divorce on children. A large 
empirical literature shows that children suffer in many ways when their 
parents divorce. If the divorcing parents do not take into account the cost 
of divorce to their children, then it might be appropriate for the government 
to increase divorce costs to simulate the costs to the children. While this 
argument has  some merit,  it also  has problems.  First,  it  is  difficult  to 
measure the effect of divorce on children. The relevant counterfactual is the 
welfare  of the  children  with  unhappy  parents  who  would  like  to  be 
divorced. In other words, discouraging the divorce of an unhappy couple 
with children does not magically create a happy couple. Second, parents do 
care about their children, and maybe they give equal weight to their own 
happiness and their children's happiness in making divorce decisions. We 
have no measures of how much they internalize such costs. Finally, divorce 
costs are imposed on couples without children when such an argument is 
irrelevant. In fact, if anything, such an argument should lead the govern-
ment to encourage divorce among couples without children so that they do 
not divorce once children arrive. 
Another possibility that has been discussed in the literature is that, when 
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marriage market. The increase in the number of single people provides a 
benefit for those already single, and this benefit is not internalized by the 
divorcing couple. The effect on the quality distribution of single people is 
harder to sign. In any case, because there is an externality, the government 
may playa role. The problem with this argument is that the externality goes 
the wrong way!  Since divorce provides a benefit to others not internalized 
by the divorcing couple, the government should provide a subsidy to divorc-
ing couples. 
The final possibility is that increased divorce costs reduce divorce prob-
abilities, causing couples to invest more and improve their relationships. 
Consider a case where a new husband and wife bargain over sending the 
wife to medical school while the husband supports her. He is more likely to 
agree to such a plan if he knows that she will not be able to divorce him 
later after she has her medical degree. Without high divorce costs, it may be 
difficult for her to credibly commit to not divorcing later. We  can tell a 
similar story about the couple investing in efficient division of labour. As 
discussed above, it may be efficient for the wife to specialize in household 
production and the husband in market production. Without a commitment 
not to divorce, the wife may not be willing to specialize because she knows 
that,  if they  later divorce,  she  will  need  to develop  market skills.  The 
problem with this argument is that the best solution here is not an imposed 
divorce cost;  rather it is  an efficient contracting mechanism.  In  the first 
example, the husband and wife should sign a binding contract determining 
how the proceeds from a medical education will be shared between them if 
a divorce occurs. In the second example, the husband and wife should agree 
upon divorce-contingent alimony at the time they are bargaining about 
specialization.  An  efficient  contract  solves  the  commitment  problem 
without causing bad marriages to remain intact. 
6  Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have aimed to demonstrate that economic tools can help 
us  understand how individuals make decisions related to marriage and 
divorce. Economists have not only developed models to explain but also have 
found evidence to support several hard-hearted theories. One is that the gains 
to marriage are not simply from sharing love and affection but from a more 
efficient use of resources (both money and time). Another is that the distribu-
tion of those resources within a marriage depends at least in part on the bar-
gaining power of each spouse. A third is that divorces may occur efficiently, 
so  that religious or social laws  governing divorce do not affect whether 
divorces occur but do affect the distribution of resources within marriage. 
As we mentioned early on, even economists have not yet come up with 
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is that, as we have argued, many different factors affect decisions to marry 
and divorce, and these factors can interact in complicated ways. A second 
reason is that it is difficult to control for all of these relevant, and chang-
ing, factors when attempting to test competing theories. For example, we 
can write down a model showing that married women are working more 
because the increased probability of divorce raises the gains to investing in 
their careers,  and another model  showing that an increase  in married 
women's labour supply raised divorce rates by augmenting friction within 
marriages. To test whether either, or both, explanations are valid, we need 
to find exogenous reasons why women are working more (to see whether 
that led to more divorce) and why divorce rates have risen (to see whether 
that led to increased labour supply). Did recent increases in women's wages 
exogenously cause women to work more? Perhaps, or else an increase in 
married women's labour supply, which boosted their investments in educa-
tion and careers and their incentive and power to fight gender discrimina-
tion, raised women's wages. Did the shift in divorce laws in the early 1970s 
from requiring mutual agreement by spouses to divorce to allowing one 
spouse to leave unilaterally exogenously cause more divorce? Perhaps, or 
else laws were changed in response to pressure from people who increas-
ingly wanted to exit their marriages. 
In summary, challenges remain for economists who are in turn challeng-
ing researchers in other disciplines to provide coherent explanations and 
empirical tests of marriage and divorce behaviour. 
Notes 
I.  In most cases, our theories apply  to state-sanctioned marriage, whether between two 
people of different or of the same genders. Without intending any bias against homo-
sexuals, we will sometimes use gender-specific terminology. 
2.  Most famously, 'palimony' (alimony for a pal) has been granted by courts under rela-
tively stringent conditions - the cohabiting relationship had to involve, 'an express or 
implied contract' (http://www.palimony.coml7.html). 
3.  Goldin and Katz (2002) documented the consequences in terms of later marriage and 
increased investment by women in education and careers that followed the dissemination 
of the pill. 
4.  The indicators of child health were calorific intake, height, weight and survival prob-
abilities. Similar outcomes were found in Cote d'Ivoire (Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995) 
and in Thailand (Schultz, 1990). 
References 
Allen, D.W. (1998), 'No-Fault Divorce In Canada: Its Cause and Effect', Journal of  Economic 
Behavior and Organization, 37 (2),129-49. 
Anonymous (2004a), 'Marriage', Judaism 101, http://www.jewfaq.org/marriage.htm. 
Anonymous (2004b), 'Divorce', Judaism 101, http://www.jewfaq.org/divorce.htm. 
Anonymous (2004c), 'Fact Sheet: Equal Pay for Working Women', www.alfcio.org. 
Becker, G.S. (1974), 'A Theory of the Allocation of Time', Economic Journal, 75, 493-517. 
Becker, G.S. (1981), A Treatise on the Family, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Economics of  marriage and divorce  167 
Bergstrom, T.  (1997), 'A Survey of Theories of the Family', in Mark Rozenzweig and Oded 
Stark (eds), Handbook of  Population Economics, New York: North Holland, pp. 21-74. 
Bergstrom, T., L. Blume and H. Varian (1986), 'On the Private Provision of Public Goods', 
Journal of  Public Economics, 29 (I), 25-49. 
Binner, 1. and A. Dnes (2001), 'Marriage, Divorce, and Legal Change', Economic Inquiry, 39, 
298-306. 
Brien, M., L. Lillard and S. Stern (2006), 'Cohabitation, Marriage, and Divorce in a Model of 
Match Quality', International Economic Review, forthcoming. 
Browning, M., F. Bourguignon, P. Chiappori and V Lechene (1994), 'Incomes and Outcomes: 
A Structural Model of Intra-Household Allocation', Journal of  Political Economy, 102 (6), 
1067-96. 
Cherlin, A. (1992),  Marriage,  Divorce,  and Remarriage, 2nd edn, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Coase, R. (1960), 'The Problem of Social Cost', Journal of  Law and Economics, 3 (I), 1-44. 
Coelho, C. and N. Garoupa (2004), 'Did Divorce Law Reforms Raise Divorce Rates? Evidence 
from Portugal', Draft, Universidade Nova de Lisboa. 
Friedberg, L. (1998),  'Did Unilateral Divorce Raise Divorce Rates? Evidence from  Panel 
Data', American Economic Review, 88 (3), 608-27. 
Goldin, C.  and L.  Katz (2002),  'The Power of the Pill: Oral Contraceptives and Women's 
Career and Marriage Decisions', Journal of  Political Economy, 110 (4), 730-70. 
Hoddinott, 1.  and L.  Haddad (1995),  'Does Female Income Share Influence  Household 
Expenditures? Evidence from Cote d'Ivoire', Oxford Bulletin of  Economics and Statistics, 
57 (1),77-96. 
Lundberg, S. and R. Pollak (1993), 'Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market', 
Journal of  Political Economy, 101 (6),988-1010. 
Lundberg, S., R. Pollak and T. Wales (1997), 'Do Husbands and Wives Pool their Resources? 
Evidence from the UK Child Benefit', Journal of  Human Resources, 32 (3), 463-80. 
Manser, M. and M. Brown (1980), 'Marriage and Household Decision Making: A Bargaining 
Analysis', International Economic Review, 21,31-44. 
McElroy, M. and M. Horney (1981), 'N  ash-Bargained Decisions: Toward a Generalization of 
the Theory of Demand', International Economic Review, 22 (2),333-49. 
Nash, 1. (1950), 'The Bargaining Problem', Econometrica, 18 (1),155-62. 
Schultz, P.T. (1990), 'Testing the Neoclassical Model of Family Labor Supply and Fertility', 
Journal of  Human Resources, 25 (4),599-634. 
Thomas, D. (1990), 'Intra-Household Resource Allocation: An Inferential Approach', Journal 
of  Human Resources, 25 (4), 635-64. 
United Nations (various years), Demographic Yearbook, New York: Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs, Statistical Office, United Nations. 
United States National Center for Health Statistics (various years),  Vital Statistics of the 
United States, Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics, United States Center 
for Disease Control. 
Weiss, Y. and R. Willis (1985), 'Children as Collective Goods in Divorce Settlements', Journal 
of  Labor Economics, 3 (3), 268-92. 
Wolfers, 1.  (2003), 'Did Unilateral Divorce Raise Divorce Rates? A Reconciliation and New 
Results', National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 10014. 
Woolley, F. (1988), 'A Non-Cooperative Model of Family Decision Making', LSE Working 
Paper, TIDI/125. 
Youssef, H. (1993), The History of the Condom', Journal of  the Royal Society of Medicine, 
86 (4),226-8. 